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This article investigates some of the primary assumptions and values that underpin 
correctional practice in the area of offender rehabilitation. It is suggested that values 
are reflected in offenders’ and clinicians’ fundamental beliefs about the rehabilitative 
process and as such underlie their various actions. This article identifies three areas in 
which values may be important (organisational values about crime and punishment, 
professional values, and personal values) and discusses each in relation to its relevance 
for rehabilitative practice. It is concluded that despite the apparent role of values in the 
correctional domain, very little is known about the values of those who deliver reha-
bilitative programs and how these might influence rehabilitative outcomes.
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Although forensic practitioners have in recent years become interested in under-standing more about the personal concerns of offenders and their associated 
goals (e.g., McMurran, 2002), often the primary focus of this work has been on 
motivational and responsivity issues rather than the values that arguably underlie 
them. Values reflect fundamental commitments concerning what is worthwhile and 
best in life and as such underlie choices about how to behave. In this way, it is sug-
gested that values are evident in the broad life goals individuals set for themselves 
and others and in the way in which these goals are pursued. In this article, we discuss 
the potential importance of the values that therapists hold about offenders and the 
rehabilitation process. We consider how these values might influence their assess-
ment and treatment activities and affect, either directly or indirectly, their ability to 
successfully rehabilitate offenders. Our discussion is necessarily general and tenta-
tive in nature in view of the apparent neglect of this topic in forensic psychotherapy1 
and the broader correctional domain: A search of the major psychology and crimi-
nology databases revealed that almost no published empirical work on this topic has 
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been published. It is also an area that is likely to be contentious: Prilleltensky and 
Prilleltensky (2006) have argued that the very term values provokes strong reactions 
in people, leading to the polarisation of debate about, for example, issues such as 
the rights of the individual versus the rights of the state. The intention of this article 
then is to examine how values might influence rehabilitative practice and to stimu-
late further discussion among both researchers and practitioners about this topic. 
Although we acknowledge that values reveal individuals’ fundamental commitments 
and as such carry additional political, cultural, and social meanings alongside narrower 
self-regarding concerns, in an introductory article such as this we cannot cover this 
important but vast territory. Therefore, we do not aim to discuss or apply critical psycho-
logical jurisprudence perspectives to the practice of rehabilitation, although inter-
ested readers are referred to the work of Arrigo (2002) for an excellent analysis of 
some of these issues.
Why the Interest in Values?
Before it is possible to engage in empirical research into values and their impact 
on practice, it is first necessary to inquire into their conceptual nature. Even a cur-
sory glance at the relevant literature reveals that there have been numerous attempts 
over time to define values, ranging from simply equating them to individuals’ desires 
and preferences to regarding them as part of the very fabric of the world (Rescher, 
1993). That is, ranging from subjective, somewhat idiosyncratic phenomena to fea-
tures of the world created by a religious entity or possibly having evolved through a 
process such as natural selection. In our view, one of the most rationally persuasive 
and psychologically helpful ways of understanding values is to view them in natu-
ralistic terms as important features of individuals’ lives and experiences, based on 
human needs and shared living conditions, that reliably meet their core interests and 
promote individual and community well-being (see Kekes, 1993). That is, values 
reflect individuals’ judgements about what kind of activities and experiences are 
worth pursing in their lives and likely to meet their core and related interests. This 
definition encompasses those offered by others, such as Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, and 
Loges (1994), who define values as “enduring prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs 
that a specific mode of conduct (instrumental value) or end state of existence (termi-
nal value) is preferred to another mode of conduct or end state” (p. 3). Values are 
arguably derived from individuals’ social and cultural allegiances that as a person 
develops provide him or her with a set of normative resources that guide both day-
to-day and important life decisions. The social world encountered by children is 
usefully construed as a web of beliefs, practices, and goals that help them to con-
struct a sense of meaning and purpose. As individuals become persons (autonomous 
agents) and acquire the capabilities necessary to reflect critically on their goals and 
actions, they to some extent become self-creating. It is at this point that values become 
recognisably their own and provide a sense of meaning and uniqueness. Ultimate 
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values are evident in the abstract principles people call on to justify or defend their 
actions when challenged or when engaged in evaluating significant life options, 
whereas more concrete values represent specific ways of realising these abstract 
values in particular contexts. Ward and Maruna (2007) have suggested that criminal 
actions can be partly viewed as problematic ways of seeking abstract values that are 
intrinsically worthwhile but in ways that ultimately result in anti-social outcomes 
and frequently self-defeating consequences. An example of such criminal and self-
defeating strategies is the attempt to establish a sense of personal autonomy through 
intimidating and physically assaulting a romantic partner.
A particularly important issue here is the nature of the relationship between val-
ues and behaviour. Values can be understood as either embodied in our actions or as 
relatively independent from them. These are complex philosophical issues, but for 
the present discussion we have chosen to understand values primarily in relation to 
their influence on those attitudes and beliefs about ourselves and other people that 
signify moral worth and, as a consequence, influence how we relate to others. As 
such, values are directly related to core principles such as those that underpin most 
contemporary professional codes of ethics.
It has been suggested that although values are always implicit in what researchers 
and practitioners say or do, they are often not articulated in specific discourses or 
practice guidelines (Ward & Maruna, 2007). Others have suggested that ethical codes 
are typically too abstract or too general to influence psychological practice, advocat-
ing a process of ethical decision making in situations when ethical issues arise. Such 
approaches demand a consideration of personal and professional values if ethically 
responsible decisions are to be arrived at (Bush, Connell, & Denney, 2006).
What is the connection between values and forensic psychotherapeutic practice? 
We propose that values play a significant role in offender rehabilitation theories 
because they serve to identify therapeutic goals and to place boundaries on what 
might be considered to be appropriate rehabilitative attempts (e.g., we should not 
subject individuals to empirically unsupported interventions or expose them to unnec-
essarily stressful situations). Furthermore, values inform decisions about how to 
balance the needs of individual offenders with those of the community when devel-
oping intervention and management plans. We would suggest that such decisions 
need to be made in an explicit and reasoned manner.
It has further been suggested that the process of behaviour change is also facili-
tated by practitioners, who, by the way in which they relate to offenders, display par-
ticular sets of values. For example, during 50 years of counselling, clinical psychology, 
and psychotherapy, research has consistently pointed to the contribution of a number 
of non-specific features of treatment to positive outcomes, such as Truax and Carkhuff’s 
(1967) triad of accurate empathy, non-specific warmth, and genuineness. Such char-
acteristics are reliably associated with beneficial outcomes for both individual cli-
ents and the broader community and are clearly underpinned by a set of values that 
are accepting of client perspectives about their problems and afford them autonomy 
and control over their lives.
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For others, the active exploration of values is an important part of the rehabilita-
tive process. Ward and Marshall (2007), for example, have argued that the therapeu-
tic change process for sexual offenders is itself intimately bound up with the use of 
self-reflection to alter personal values to help offenders fashion a sense of their 
future that is personally fulfilling and socially responsible. The process requires 
therapists to present their own values—or at the very least those that they see as 
representative of the community—as reference points from which self-reflection can 
occur. Thigpen, Beauclair, Keiser, Guevara, and Mestad (2007) have further sug-
gested that the therapist should act as a model and demonstrate anti-criminal expres-
sions of behaviour and that the effective practitioner must be consistent and unerring 
in communicating pro-social and high moral values. Interventions for perpetrators 
of domestic violence offer another example of where the modelling of pro-social 
values is regarded as critical to therapeutic change (Pence & Paymar, 1983).
Although this position might on first glance appear unorthodox (given the long-
standing tradition within psychology that the values of the therapist are not to be 
expressed or imposed on the client—Freud, for example, encouraged the clinician 
to be opaque to his patients), closer examination of the psychotherapy literature 
across the past 40 years reveals that not only do therapists freely communicate their 
values to their clients but that clients are also frequently influenced by these com-
munications (e.g., Kessel & McBrearty, 1967). Martin (2006) has argued that ethical 
values are evident in mental health practices in at least three major ways: (a) Ethical 
behaviour is likely to result in better levels of well-being and psychological health 
(e.g., compassion deepens relationships), (b) clients are expected to take at least 
some degree of responsibility for their treatment, and (c) many mental disorders 
such as personality disorders and the paraphilias are in part defined by the values 
that the community holds about certain behaviours.
Commentaries on contemporary psychotherapy, such as that offered by Richardson 
(2006), have identified some of the paradoxes in approaches that result from 
attempting to create a value-neutral psychotherapy (particularly in relation to the 
promotion of individualism and instrumentalism). Fowers (2006) offers what he 
terms a “frankly moral dialogue” in relation to the application of virtue ethics to 
psychotherapy as a means of “helping clients to cultivate the best in themselves 
and to live the best kind of life available to them” (p. 39). The underlying premise 
of Fowers’s approach is that human beings are goal-seeking beings who act to 
accomplish meaningful aims, with virtues seen as the character strengths by which 
people can pursue human goods. This work has clear application to the criminal 
justice arena and resonates with the approaches to offender rehabilitation that 
promote the pursuit of human goods as an effective method of managing risk (see 
Ward & Maruna, 2007).
The focus of this article is on understanding those values that underpin forensic 
psychotherapeutic practice. It is suggested that the acquisition of these types of values 
is partly the result of professional training, correctional contexts (i.e., the “culture” of 
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an institution or agency), self-reflection, experience, and the personal experiences of 
therapists.
Criminal Justice Values
The values held by therapists typically derive from their professional roles, con-
ceptions of mental health, theoretical commitments, and social identities (Martin, 
2006). Those psychotherapists working within criminal justice settings adopt a pro-
fessional helping role that contrasts with a system that is based primarily on punish-
ing “bad” behaviour, thus placing them in a rather unique clinical situation. This 
suggests that for these therapists at least, there is likely to be a particularly close 
relationship between the moral and therapeutic aspects of their practice (although 
see Martin, 2006).
Slobogin and Fondacaro (2000) have proposed three different models that can be 
used to justify the deprivation of liberty of an individual within the criminal justice 
system. A punishment model where the focus is retrospective and on punishing peo-
ple for the harm they have caused; a prevention model where the focus is prospective 
and concerned with preventing harm to self or others, through either deterrence or 
restraint; and finally a protection model that seeks to ensure rights and privileges of 
individuals. Although there are examples where these models are mixed, for exam-
ple, in prison hospitals, therapeutic communities within prisons, and “program pris-
ons,” Slobogin and Fondacaro note that the criminal justice system is in essence “the 
closest manifestation of the punishment model” (p. 501). Indeed, punishment in 
response to crime is the prevailing practice in most societies (Wachtel, 1999).
Although the core values of most modern correctional systems explicitly espouse 
rehabilitative ideals in their mission statements, few would maintain that prisons are not 
punishing environments. Although it is acknowledged that punishment can be ethically 
justified by appealing either to its consequences or to the nature of wrongful acts 
themselves, there is little doubt that the conditions of imprisonment frequently add 
significant burdens on offenders beyond the simple deprivation of liberty (Kleinig, 
2008). A combination of unsympathetic public attitudes and overly crude interpreta-
tions of retributive ethics may result in harsh and at times demeaning conditions for 
imprisoned individuals that ultimately create ethical and therapeutic challenges for 
practitioners. The work of Toch and Adams (2002) in the United States and that of 
Liebling (2004) in the United Kingdom is testament to the fact that many prisoners 
experience prisons as aversive and extremely stressful environments in which to 
live. Culturally, we would suggest, values reflecting accountability and punishment 
are pervasive, underlying the very system of government in Western democracies. It 
may be that those who choose to work in correctional environments have values that 
are broadly consistent with this approach (i.e., accept that their clients are there 
because they are in some way morally culpable for their behaviour and are being 
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punished). Indeed, the available research on the attitudes of correctional officers 
suggest that on the whole, prison staff hold rather unsympathetic attitudes towards 
prisoners. In one study by Larivière (2001), less than one quarter of Canadian cor-
rectional officers held empathetic views of prisoners, and three quarters believed 
that the role of corrections ought to be punitive. There are considerable difficulties 
created by the fact that although imprisonment can be seen as an appropriate response 
to many crimes, it is also important for practitioners to treat offenders as moral agents 
with the inherent value and dignity that this status bestows. The tendency to extend 
the scope of punishment to the imposition of harsh conditions of imprisonments can 
threaten the ethical status of offenders and lead correctional workers to behave in 
ethically unacceptable ways (Kleinig, 2008).
Very little is known about the ways in which rehabilitation providers view their 
clients, although in a provocative analysis of the ethical issues underlying mandated 
offender rehabilitation with sex offenders, Glaser (2003) has argued that much of the 
way in which treatment is delivered should be understood in terms of treatment pro-
viders administering punishment to their clients on behalf of the community. Although 
this article attracted a rebuttal from others in the field,2 one implication of Glaser’s 
analysis is that those who work in these settings are able, at the very least, to tolerate 
working within a punishment-oriented environment, perhaps because they are sym-
pathetic to the notion that their clients have forfeited their moral or human rights by 
virtue of their offending. There is an underlying question here of whether prisons (and 
the broader criminal justice system) should aim to punish. The interest that many 
forensic psychotherapists have in therapeutic jurisprudence initiatives (see Glaser, 
2003) suggests that there is some discomfort with the notion of punishment and the 
idea that they are in some ways complicit in the punishment process.
Prilleltensky and Prilleltensky (2006) have further suggested that organisations are 
critical to how values are enacted: “they are the places where individuals pursue their 
goals, where governments enact policies, and where human service workers try to amel-
iorate suffering and promote wellness for all” (p. 54). They argue that a set of comple-
mentary values are required to promote personal and communal well-being at the same 
time, and yet there may also be contradictions between systems based on punishment and 
the task of bringing about behaviour change through psychological intervention. 
McGuire (2002) and others (e.g., Andrews & Bonta, 2003) have persuasively argued that 
the type of punishment administered by criminal justice systems is unlikely to be effec-
tive in bringing about behaviour change in ways that effectively manage risk. Irrespective 
of the attitudes held towards offenders, this debate reveals the deep but often unacknowl-
edged influence of ethical values on the culture and practice of forensic psychotherapy.
Professional Values
Although researchers have shown some interest in particular values held by 
therapists (such as those towards religion and in relation to sexuality; e.g., Bergin, 
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1991), recent theoretical work on ethical issues in forensic psychotherapeutic prac-
tice from a human rights perspective has linked psychological practice to two core 
values of freedom and well-being (e.g., Ward & Birgden, 2007). Ward, Gannon, and 
Vess (2009) have further proposed that forensic psychotherapists should seek to 
promote these values in their clinical work if they are to act ethically, although in 
practice the critical issue here is being able to articulate the circumstances or condi-
tions under which the right to choose how to live one’s life should be curtailed. This 
is a complex area for which no professional guidelines exist and yet forms the basis 
for many of the conversations about values that routinely arise in the course of the 
delivery of offender rehabilitation programs.
The ability of the therapist to take a particular stance towards his or her client, 
regardless their legal status or criminal charge, is fundamentally predicated on how 
the therapist constructs not only the general meaning of criminal behaviour but also 
an understanding of those who would commit such crimes. Rehabilitation practition-
ers are required, in their clinical practice, to reconcile the belief that people have 
personal agency and make rational decisions about their behaviour, with an emerg-
ing body of research suggesting that offenders (and people in general) have much 
less conscious control over their behaviour than was previously thought (Andrews 
& Bonta, 2003). For example, non-rational processes in relation to emotional regula-
tion are increasingly identified as important precursors to offending (see Day, 2009). 
It is also clear from studies in experimental psychology with non-offender popu-
lations just how much negative emotions can affect subsequent rational decision 
making (e.g., Damasio, 1994).
In addition, developmental theories of offending have identified an important link 
between early childhood abuse and neglect and economic disadvantage and offend-
ing risk (Homel, 1999). It is widely acknowledged that offenders arrive in prison 
with long histories of psychological and social problems. They are more likely to 
have come from large families with siblings or parents who had offended and expe-
rienced poor parental supervision, family disruption, and physical and sexual abuse 
in childhood (e.g., Farrington & Welsh, 2007), all of which may result in emotional 
dysregulation, anti-social attitudes, and behavioural problems (see Salekin, Rosenbaum, 
& Lee’s, 2008, review of developmental factors in psychopathy).
With respect to the effects of abuse on children, research has revealed that they 
are frequently pervasive, severe, and can create vulnerabilities for a wide range of 
psychological, social, and behavioural problems. Beitchman, Zucker, and Hood 
(2002) described the long-term effects of sexual abuse as poor social adjustment, 
disturbed sexual functioning, sexual identity confusion, inappropriate attempts to 
assert masculinity, and the presence of traumatic symptoms. Research on victims has 
demonstrated that they frequently suffer a loss of trust, hope, self-efficacy, sense of a 
future, and a loss of goals and desire, essentially an experience of what Walker 
(2006) has labelled normative abandonment. In brief, this is the perception that the 
default and explicit values on which everyday life is built no longer holds. Thus it 
becomes increasingly difficult to rely on other people or hope that the future will be 
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a positive one. The extent to which offenders who have extensive histories of vic-
timisation can and should be held responsible for their behaviour is thus an impor-
tant one, legally, ethically, and clinically (Ward & Moreton, in press). It is an area 
that demands reflection about our personal and professional values and how we 
approach issues of personal responsibility.
Personal Values
Rather little is known about the personal values that bring people to train as psy-
chologists and subsequently work in forensic settings. An important point noted 
earlier is that personal values are related to character traits that directly affect the 
ways therapists think, feel, and act within correctional contexts. That is, individuals’ 
personal commitments are likely to create habitual ways of thinking and acting that 
if not reflected on critically may result in poor practice and even unethical behaviour 
(Martin, 2006). Therapist values can also be understood as directly influencing the 
ability of the clinician to form strong therapeutic alliances with clients—most nota-
bly in relation to the aspect of alliance that Bordin (1994) has referred to as the 
“bond” or attachment formed between the client and therapist. It is likely that highly 
discrepant therapist–client values can adversely affect treatment outcomes by impair-
ing the development of a strong relational bond.
Most of the available research on personal values has been conducted with prac-
tising psychotherapists and has only a limited application to offender populations. 
Guy (1987), following a series of interviews with leading practitioners, described 
the different types of motivation that led people to work as psychotherapists. Guy 
reported both functional (e.g., curiosity, emotional insight, self-denial, empathy, 
tolerance of ambiguity) and dysfunctional (e.g., vicarious coping, need for intimacy, 
emotional distress) motivators. Analyses of this type are useful as they offer ideas as 
to how and when therapists make mistakes (“therapeutic blunders”) with their cli-
ents, or even act in anti-therapeutic ways (e.g., the therapist who needs to feel impor-
tant, so fosters dependency in clients; the therapist who is reminded of his or her own 
problems and responds with pseudo-optimism and facile re-assurance; the therapist 
who gives uncalled for advice as a means of appearing wise). They also point to 
some of the underlying personal values that therapists hold and how these influence 
their approach to the work. For example, a therapist who is functionally motivated 
by a genuine curiosity in other people is likely to hold values that are consistent with 
respecting others’ viewpoints and respond to clients in an interested manner.
One issue that forensic practitioners often face is how to best respond to those 
whose behaviour they do not condone and those who express values that may be anti-
thetical to their own (e.g., misogynistic or abusive). In spite of (or even because of) 
professional training that espouses a non-evaluative approach to client work, per-
sonal values may, in some circumstances, allow the individual therapist to give himself 
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or herself permission to condemn or blame clients for their offending. This is clinically 
important given that other-blame is commonly identified as the core appraisal underly-
ing anger arousal (Smith & Lazarus, 1993), suggesting that a natural consequence of 
blame is anger. It should be self-evident that working therapeutically with clients in 
circumstances where the therapist is angry is likely to be almost impossible.
Along with feelings of anger for offenders may also be feelings of contempt and 
disgust (cf. Izard’s, 1977, hostility triad of other-condemning emotions). Rozin, 
Haidt, and McCauley (2000) have related each of these three emotions to Schweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, and Park’s (1997) theory of moral judgement, which proposes 
that three codes of ethics underlie morality. For these theorists, breaches in the ethics 
of community (issues of duty, hierarchy, and social rules) are commonly related to 
feelings of contempt; breaches in the ethics of autonomy (issues of rights and jus-
tice) are related to feelings of anger; and breaches in the ethics of divinity (issues of 
protecting the self from degradation) relate to feelings of disgust. They note, for 
example, that “people who betray friends or family, or who kill in cold blood, are 
seen as inhuman and revolting; criminal acts with ‘normal’ human motivations such 
as robbing banks, are seen as immoral but not disgusting” (pp. 643-644).
What Are the Values That Might 
Inform Offender Rehabilitation?
Prilleltensky and Prilleltensky (2006) have identified what they consider to be the 
central values that are relevant for the development of personal, organisational, and 
community well-being. They suggest that personal well-being can be understood 
in terms of two categories of value: (a) self-determination, freedom, and personal 
growth and (b) health, caring, and compassion. The key values for organisational 
well-being are accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to common ground; 
collaboration; democratic participation; and respect for human diversity. Finally, 
they suggest that the values that support community well-being include support for 
community structures and social justice. They argue that to promote well-being on 
each of these levels, “a set of values that is internally consistent, that avoids dogma-
tism and relativism, and that promotes congruence between means and ends” (p. 67) 
is needed.
It is possible to see how these particular values might be used to inform rehabili-
tative practice (see Table 1). For example, initiatives to promote personal well-being 
in prisons might aim to create opportunities for autonomy, for example, by wherever 
possible giving prisoners control over aspects of their environment. In treatment 
sessions, such values might be reflected in therapist behaviour that is respectful, 
tolerant, and empathic. Table 1 also illustrates how recent research in the area of the 
practice of offender rehabilitation programs can be categorised in relation to how it 
sits with these underlying values.
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Implications for Rehabilitative Practice
The argument presented in this article is a simple one. It is suggested that reha-
bilitation providers on one hand typically come from professional backgrounds that 
claim to be value-neutral and objective and work towards supporting, encouraging, 
and nurturing offenders and on the other hand work in a legal and cultural context 
in which offenders are typically blamed for their behaviour, punished for what they 
have done, housed in unsupportive environments, and sometimes coerced into reha-
bilitation programs. There is an apparent tension between a professed desire of many 
psychologists to be respectful, non-judgemental, and supportive of the personal 
goals of their clients and the models of treatment that are used and the punitive 
nature of the environment in which treatment is delivered. Moreover, psychologists 
are also required under professional codes of conduct to deliver treatment in ways 
that give the client control and autonomy over their treatment, and that does not 
bring about any harm to the individual. At the same time, almost nothing is known 
about the values of rehabilitation providers and how these influence their emotional 
and behavioural reactions to the offenders with whom they work. This is one area 
where it is easy to imagine how empirical research in this area might proceed.
A second avenue for empirical research relates to the influence of values on reha-
bilitative outcomes. Disagreement still exists in professional psychology about 
whether values should be minimised or controlled or disclosed to the client (Tjeltveit, 
1999). The way in which therapists present their values, and the timing of any dis-
closure, is likely to be particularly important here. In an investigation of the values 
held by a small group of eminent psychotherapists, Williams and Levitt (2007) 
found that their sample tended to prioritise the values of their clients over their own 
unless they believed that clients were deficient in the skills or abilities required to 
guide the change process. This would be directly addressed in cases where they saw 
client values as impeding the change process, although therapists felt that they were 
unable to help clients to progress in circumstances where the value conflicts were 
too large. It should also be possible to design studies that examine the influence of 
values and value conflict on program outcomes in forensic settings although there 
has been little previous empirical work in this area. This is perhaps, as Bergin (1991) 
puts it, because “therapists seem not to be in conscious control of the process of 
value conversion” and typically “do not conceptualise their work in terms of value 
conversion” (p. 160).
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of effective rehabilitation is the ability 
of the therapist to manage situations in which conflict arises between their own 
values and those of their clients (see above). To do this successfully, therapists need 
first to be aware of exactly what their values are in relation to crime and punishment 
in general and to different types of offence. Offenders know only too well that they 
have been blamed for their behaviour and often feel that they are referred to reha-
bilitation programs as part of their punishment (see O’Leary, Day, Chung, & Foster, 
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in press). A rehabilitative or restorative approach to social discipline confronts and 
disapproves of wrongdoing while supporting the intrinsic worth of the wrongdoer 
(Wachtel, 1999). The question then is the extent to which those delivering these 
programs are able to address such concerns and provide interactions with their clients 
that are essentially therapeutic.
In some circumstances, conflict between values can be explicit. Take the example 
of the offender attending a sexual offender treatment program who proclaims the 
value that sexual contact with children is desirable. The ways in which the behaviour 
of offenders can interfere with the capacity for self-determination, freedom, and 
personal growth in victims of crime are well known and clearly identified as an area 
for intervention. Often this is framed in the language of treatment (e.g., “denial,” 
“cognitive distortion”). Other situations in which value conflict arises are more 
complex. Take, for example, the values of a man who is domestically violent in rela-
tion to gender role who attends a Duluth-type intervention program. The man may 
argue that his values are consistent with those of the community in which he lives 
and the peer group with which he associates, and yet program facilitators may regard 
these values as risk factors for ongoing violence. There is a danger here that treat-
ment becomes characterised by an ideological debate, with the outcome either com-
pliance or attrition rather than behaviour change.
Value conflict between forensic psychotherapists and the organisations in which 
they work is also not unusual, and can arise in relation to the treatment of individual 
prisoners (e.g., classification and release decisions), responses to institutional prob-
lems (e.g., violence and bullying), and more general conflict in relation to the condi-
tions in which prisoners are housed. Such conflicts relate to disagreements about the 
purpose of prisons and their functions for the community that date back to the earli-
est days of corrections. For example, the idea that prison conditions should “exceed 
in adversity those existing in society” (Sir Robert Peel, cited by Morris, 2002, p. 210), 
the use of privileges and their relationship to good behaviour in prison, and the value 
of indeterminant sentences (see also Morris, 2002, for a discussion of modern cor-
rectional practice in relation to the work of early prison reformers such as Alexander 
Maconochie in the 1840s). This article does not offer solutions to these issues but 
rather seeks to raise them as important determinants of effective rehabilitation. It 
also suggests that forensic psychotherapeutic practice cannot be approached as a 
separate enterprise from the context in which it is offered. In our experience these 
issues are rarely discussed by correctional practitioners and yet would appear to be 
fundamental to any understanding of situations in which value conflict arises and 
potentially to the effectiveness of any legally mandated intervention. It is possible to 
frame a series of research questions about these issues, for example, by exploring 
the relationship between rehabilitation outcomes and ruptures in the therapeutic 
alliance back to the underlying values and premises on which services are based. 
One of the advantages of a values-based approach to correctional professional ethics 
is that it makes it easier for practitioners to appreciate the inherent value of offenders 
302  International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology
and the importance of protecting their core interests and ability to function as autono-
mous agents. From a human rights perspective, protecting individual’s well-being and 
freedom needs enables them to have a major say in what kind of life goals to pursue 
and how to do so. An emphasis on offender agency and the associated dignity derived 
from being able to make important decisions for oneself can assist therapists to think 
carefully about the way they engage offenders in assessment and treatment and to 
look for every opportunity to promote their dignity as moral agents within the con-
straints of a correctional environment (Ward, Gannon, & Birgden, 2007).
Some Problems
One problem with adopting a focus on values is that it fails to take into account the 
fact that an individual’s ability to achieve a law-abiding life will depend on his or her 
possession of a range of capabilities and opportunities. In some circumstances, a com-
bination of social, financial, and psychological deprivation makes it extremely difficult 
for people to live pro-social lives (see also Prilleltensky’s, 1997, argument that psy-
chology as a field tends to be so focussed on values within an interpersonal context 
that rarely is the political, social, or structural context acknowledged or challenged). 
We are certainly not saying such individuals ought not to be held accountable but 
rather are pointing to the obligations of the state and its relevant agencies to provide 
the core resources essential for offenders to function as effective and ethical agents.
A second issue relates to the definition and role of the discipline of forensic psy-
chotherapy. It is assumed in this article that forensic psychotherapists are charged 
with the duty not only to protect the community by reducing recidivism rates but 
also to enhance well-being and improve levels of functioning. This entails striking a 
balance between the promotion of social values that underpin relationships (such as 
honor, respect for others, and fulfilling a productive role in the community) and 
those that underpin individual development (such as agency and autonomy). It may 
be that this view is controversial. The promotion of strengths-based approaches to 
rehabilitation (e.g., see Ward & Maruna, 2007) contrasts with approaches that pri-
marily focus on risk management and reduction. For some, enhancing offender well-
being is regarded as a legitimate goal of intervention only insofar as it meets 
correctional responsibilities in relation to duty of care. Adopting a focus on values 
perhaps demands a similar emphasis on well-being in forensic psychotherapy to that 
which underpins both mental health systems (e.g., alleviating distress) and associ-
ated ethical principles (e.g., beneficence, maleficence) and is more compatible with 
approaches developed in clinical psychology. Whereas we would see this focus on 
well-being as a necessary condition for effective offender rehabilitation, we are also 
aware that others may not share this view.
Finally, the focus of this article has been on therapist values. That is not to suggest 
that these are more important than the values that offenders hold. Offender core com-
mitments have received some attention in the literature, and challenging those values 
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that underpin anti-social beliefs and attitudes is clearly central to any rehabilitative 
intervention. Furthermore, some interventions, such as Aggression Replacement Therapy 
and Moral Reconation Therapy, explicitly target the values that offenders hold. Nor 
would we suggest that therapeutic change is solely or even predominantly a function 
of therapist style. Clearly, therapeutic interventions and skills training is a critical 
component of treatment. Nevertheless, non-specific factors such as the therapeutic 
alliance have been shown to be a moderate, but significant and consistent, predictor 
of treatment outcome across a variety of therapeutic modalities and patient groups 
(e.g., Bambling & King, 2001) and have been put forward as a central mechanism to 
explain findings that different models of treatment deliver broadly equivalent out-
comes. It has also been identified as a critical feature of interventions for those with 
personality disorders (Livesley, 2001). Our contention here is that it is values that 
underpin the style that psychologists adopt with offenders and as a consequence have 
a direct influence on the formation of collaborative working relationships.
Conclusion
On a final note, it is concluded that values constitute an important therapeutic 
resource for practitioners when thinking about the reasons that offenders commit 
crimes and how best to assess and treat them. We agree with Martin (2006) and oth-
ers that it is not feasible or even desirable to quarantine values from the everyday 
practice of forensic psychotherapy. Values penetrate deeply into every facet of reha-
bilitative work and whether we are aware of it or not influence our responses to 
offenders and our subsequent professional actions. Values are not only directly 
reflected in the goals offenders hold when committing offences and the ways in 
which they choose to live their lives but are also evident in the countless professional 
decisions made by forensic practitioners.
Notes
1. This term has been preferred in this article to refer to the application of psychological treatment to 
offender populations.
2. We are not persuaded by Glaser’s analysis and think that it is possible to combine risk reduction 
and welfare-oriented treatment approaches through a model underpinned by human rights theory that 
specifies offenders’ core ethical entitlements while also spelling out their obligations to other people and 
the community (see also Ward & Birgden, 2007).
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